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Abstract
Empirical evidence suggests that natural resources breed corruption and reduce educational at-
tainments, dampening economic growth. The theoretical literature has treated these two channels
separately, with natural resources a¤ecting growth either through human capital or corruption. In
this paper, we argue that education and corruption are jointly determined and depend on the en-
dowment of natural resources. Natural resources a¤ect the incentives to invest in education and rent
seeking that in turn a¤ect growth. Whether natural resources stimulate growth or induce a poverty-
trap crucially depends on inequality in access to education and political participation, as well as on
the cost of political participation. For lower inequality and higher cost of political participation, a
high-growth and a poverty-trap equilibrium co-exist even with abundant natural resources.
JEL Classication: D72, J24, O11, O13, O41.
Key words: Natural resources, Resource curse, Growth, Human capital, Rent-seeking, Corruption.
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1 Introduction
Recent evidence shows that the abundance of natural resources can be a curse as it may dampen the
accumulation of other productive capitals such as human capital and social capital (here specically,
absence of corruption). Gylfason (2001) nds that across countries, school enrollment at all levels is
inversely related to the abundance of natural resources. Another strand of literature shows that countries
rich in natural resources tend to generate higher rents and seem more prone to rent-seeking. Rent seeking
in turn prevents growth and development. Ross (2001) reports that in Southeast Asia (Philippines,
Indonesia and Malaysia) a hardwood timber price boom created rents that compelled political elites to
alter the institutions to acquire greater control over resource rents, and as a result political power became
more concentrated and corruption increased. Furthermore, social capital and human capital also reinforce
each other. Empirical evidence suggests that corruption and education are inversely correlated (Svensson
2005, Glaser et al. 2004). Yet, the theoretical literature has treated them separately with natural
resources a¤ecting growth either through human capital (Gylfason et al. 1999, Torvik 2001, Bravo-Ortega
and Gregorio 2005) or through rent seeking (Baland and Francois 2000, Torvik 2002). Others show a
joint determination of corruption and education (Ehrlich and Lui 1999, and Eicher, García-Peñalosa and
van Ypersele 2009). In this paper we combine all three strands of literature and argue that education
and rent seeking are jointly determined. Natural resources a¤ect both human capital and corruption,
implying the co-movements among these three variables observed in empirical evidence.
The last few years have witnessed a growing evidence that countries rich in natural resources perform
worse than those without resources (Sach and Warner 1995, 1999, 2001, Gylfason et al. 1999, Gylfa-
son 2001, Auty 2001, Birdsall et al. 2001, Robinson et al. 2006, Mehlum et al. 2006). On average
natural resource rich countries have slower growth, lower education, bad institutions and more corrup-
tion. Gylfason (2001) reports that for OPEC countries, GNP per capita decreased by 1.3 percent per
year on average during 1965-98 compared with 2.2 percent average per capita growth in all lower- and
middle-income countries. Nigeria provides a perfect example of resource curse. Oil revenues per capita in
Nigeria increased from US$33 in 1965 to US$325 in 2000, but income per capita has stagnated at around
US$1100 in PPP terms since its independence in 1960 putting Nigeria among the 15 poorest countries in
the world (Bevan et al. 1999).
On the other hand, the success stories of some resource abundant countries, i.e. USA, Canada, Norway,
and Botswana highlight the fact that resource abundance is not always associated with poor economic
performance. In these cases, the resource boom stimulated growth and improved welfare.1 Prime example
1Stijns (2006) even contests the claim that resource abundance crowds out human capital.
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that can be cited is the Botswana. Forty percent of Botswanas GDP stems from diamonds, but Botswana
has managed to beat the resource curse. It has the second highest public expenditure on education as a
fraction of GNP, it enjoys the worlds highest growth rate since 1965 and its GDP per capita is at least
ten times that of Nigeria (Sarraf and Jiwanji, 2001). In their empirical investigation, Mehlum, Moene
and Torvik (2006) nd that whether resources are a curse or a blessing crucially depends on whether
the institutions are grabber-friendly or producer-friendly. They conclude that institutional quality is the
key to understanding the resource curse: when institutions are bad, resource abundance is a curse; when
institutions are good, resource abundance is a blessing. Their ndings coincide with those of Gylfason
(2001) who nds that the relationship between school enrollment and natural resource abundance is non-
monotonic. Thus, empirically, higher resource abundance can be compatible with higher growth, higher
investment in human capital and lower corruption.
Theoretically, the resource cursehas mainly been explained by two types of theories; market-based
and political economy based. Market-based explanations rely on the Dutch diseasehypothesis, where
a resource boom is linked to a crowding out of manufacturing exports. Lately, focus has shifted toward
other crowding out e¤ects especially on the forgone investment in human capital. According to this
view, the natural resource sector is considered to be unskilled and it does not generate learning by doing
and spillover e¤ects. The abundance of natural resources shifts factors of production away from the
manufacturing sector that generates learning by doing, thus, reducing productivity growth (Gylfason
et al. 1999, Bravo-Ortega and Gregorio 2005). This is further extended in Torvik (2001), where all
sectors contribute to learning by doing and there are spillover among them. He concludes that whether
abundance of natural resources reduces the growth or not depends on the structural characteristics of the
economy.
On the other hand, the political economy argument maintains that the presence of natural resources
creates rents, especially when institutions are weak it may give rise to voracity e¤ects. Interest groups
divert their time and energies to capture these rents, which results in a miss-allocation of time and talent.
Torvik (2002) argues that natural resource abundance increases the number of entrepreneurs engaged in
rent seeking and reduces the number of entrepreneurs running productive rms. More natural resources,
thus, lead to a lower welfare. Baland and Francois (2000) provide conditions under which resource booms
lead to an increase in rent-seeking activity. Lane and Tornell (1999) and Auty (2001) also show that the
resource curse operates through rent-seeking and voracity e¤ects.
Our contribution in this paper is twofold. First, in contrast to the existing theoretical literature which
generally considers low educational attainment, corruption and abundant natural resources separately, or
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at best in pairs, we combine all three strands of literature where natural resources a¤ect both education
and corruption. We argue that human capital and rent seeking are jointly determined, where in our case
human capital implies formal schooling rather than learning by doing.2 Second, in line with the diversi-
ed experiences of resource rich countries, we show that the relationship between resource abundance
and resource curse is non-monotonic. Our model assumptions imply that human capital is the only
productive capital. Our treatment of human capital di¤ers from those of Gylfason et al. (1999) and
Bravo-Ortega and Gregorio (2005) who use learning by doing mechanisms. First, both of these models
are based on the Dutch disease hypothesis that has failed to fetch empirical support. Sala-i-Martin and
Subramanian (2003) nd that corruption, and granting of import licenses rather than Dutch disease are
the reasons why oil richness of Nigeria turned into a curse.3 Second, we use a concept of formal education
that captures more closely the measures used in empirical literature as compared to learning-by-doing.
Third, they do not consider rent seeking neither do they allow for heterogeneous agents.
We develop an endogenous growth model with two sectors; an industrial sector and a natural resource
sector. The industrial sector employs human capital, whereas the natural resource sector uses natural
resources and unskilled labor.4 Although the natural resource sector does not employ human capital, there
is a positive externality from human capital accumulation to production in the natural resource sector.
The central element in our analysis is the decision to accumulate political capital that enables agents to
divert rents from the natural resource sector, and the trade-o¤ between investing in human and political
capitals. Individuals can divide their time between working and investing in human and/or political
capital accumulation. Our setting has common features with Ehrlich and Lui (1999) who look at the
trade-o¤ between corruption and human capital but do not consider natural resources. Our model di¤ers
from theirs in a number of ways: the introduction of a natural resource sector, the source of heterogeneity
among the agents and the monetary costs associated with corruption (quality of institutions).
Natural resources are generally state owned and if institutions are weak, they can easily be appropri-
ated by the ruling class. Thus it provides them with incentives to invest in accumulating political power
and extracting the rents accruing from natural resources. We assume that access to political participation
depends on the class one belongs to. We consider a source of heterogeneity that captures the patterns of-
ten observed in developing countries where the right to rule and access to education is conned to specic
2This is important as the empirical studies use the data on education that represent the formal schooling rather than
learning by doing.
3See Bulte et al. (2005) for more discussion on the empirical failure of Dutch disease hypothesis.
4 In our settings, there is no skilled labor competition between industrial and natural resource sectors, a mechanism that
is used in the Dutch disease literature. Since, we consider formal schooling rather than learning by doing (in Dutch disease
literature, only industrial sector generates learning by doing), labor movements do not play very signicant role.
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ethnic or linguistic groups. We suppose that society is divided into two groups; the elite and the non-elite
(workers). The elite have access to the technologies for political and human capital accumulation, while
the workers do not.
Another new element in our model is that we emphasize the fact that institutions play a pivotal role
for the returns of rent seeking. We introduce a monetary cost associated with rent seeking that depicts
the quality of institutions. The better quality institutions would imply more costly rent seeking. Thus,
lower the cost is, the more conducive would be the institutions for rent seeking and the more protable
would be the investment in political capital. In this way, although, natural resources generate rents that
always invite rent seeking, given the cost of political participation, it might not always be protable to
be corrupt.
We nd that the economy may exhibit a high-growth equilibrium, with fast growth, high accumula-
tion of human capital and no corruption (no rent seeking); a low-growth equilibrium, with slow growth,
low investment in both human and political capitals; and a poverty-trap equilibrium, with no growth,
no investment in human capital, and higher corruption. In which of these three equilibria the econ-
omy is depends on the endowment of natural resources. There are endogenous thresholds of natural
resources that demarcate di¤erent equilibria. For low abundance of natural resources, there is a unique
high-growth equilibrium and for high abundance, there is a unique poverty-trap equilibrium; while for
intermediate levels of natural resources, there are multiple equilibria where the high-growth equilibrium
either coexists with the poverty-trap equilibrium or with the low-growth equilibrium. The thresholds
that demarcate di¤erent equilibria are endogenous and crucially depend on two parameters; inequality in
access to education and political participation, and the monetary cost of political participation (quality
of institutions). Depending on these two parameters, the poverty-trap and the high-growth equilibrium
can coexist. Particularly, increasing access to education and political participation would increase the
range of natural resource endowments where there is a high-growth equilibrium and would decrease the
range of natural resources where there is a poverty-trap equilibrium. Similarly, increasing the quality of
institutions would reduce the returns to rent seeking and would increase the range of natural resource
endowments where there is a high-growth equilibrium.
The rest of paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we dene our model. Section 3 solves the
model, while section 4 characterizes the di¤erent equilibria and examines the comparative statics. The
last section concludes.
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2 Model assumptions
2.1 Households
There is an overlapping generations economy of population N of two-period lived individuals. Agents
within each generation are di¤erentiated by the access to human and political capital accumulation
technologies. Of those, n are the elitewho have access to both human and political capital accumulation
technologies. Others, l = N   n are unskilled workers, they do not have access to the technologies for
accumulating human or political capital, and work in natural resource sector.5 In this way the source
of heterogeneity is inequality in access to education and political participation, while within each group
agents are homogeneous.6 All agents are endowed with one divisible unit of time in each period. The
elite divide their time between schooling, accumulating political capital and working in the manufacturing
sector while unskilled workers spend their entire time working in the natural resource sector.
All individuals born at t = 0; 1; 2; ::: have identical preferences, represented by the utility function
U = c1t + c2t (1)
where  < 1 is the discount factor and c1t and c2t is the consumption in rst and second period,
respectively. Linear utility function allows us to focus on the income e¤ects that are more important for
our problem than the intertemporal substitution e¤ects.
2.2 Technologies
The accumulation of human capital is the engine of growth. Only the elite have access to education
and political process. They invest in human capital when young and in political capital when old. In
this way, returns to education would depend on the investment in political capital and it will augment a
trade-o¤ between two capitals that we are interested in. They are endowed with one unit of time in each
period. In the rst period they divide this time between accumulating human capital Ht and working
in the manufacturing sector. Let hit be the time spent by the ith member of the elite in accumulating
human capital so that 1   hit is the time spent for working. In the second period he spends time qit in
accumulating political capital so that 1 qit is the time spent for working. The stock of human (political)
capital of individual when young is the inherited human (political) capital from his parents. In the second
5This is one type of the heterogeneity that we incorporate, their can, of course be another source of heterogeneity where
may be both groups have access to education while only one group has access to political process.
6This is, of course, a simplication which allows us to solve the model smoothly, other specication can be when the
elite are also heterogeneous.
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period, his human (political) capital is a function of his inherited stock of human (political) capital and
the time devoted to its accumulation when young.
Hi2t = Ah

itHi1t 0 <  < 1 (2)
where Hi1t denotes individuals inherited stock of human capital, Hi1t = Hi2t 1, hit the fraction of time
invested in creating human capital and A a technological parameter.
Qi2t = Bq

itQi1t 0 <  < 1 (3)
where Qi1t denotes individuals inherited stock of political capital, Qi1t = Qi2t 1, qit the fraction of time
invested in creating political capital and B a technological parameter.
There are two sectors in the economy: the rst one produces a manufacturing good and second one
consists of extraction of the natural resources. The manufacturing sector employs human capital, with
every skilled worker producing one unit of output. Aggregate output in manufacturing sector is
Y mt =
X
i
[(1  hit)Hi1t + (1  qit 1)Hi2t 1] (4)
Individual i produces Y mi1t = (1   hit)Hi1t when young and Y mi2t = (1   qit)Hi2t when old. Equation (4)
implies that the source of growth is the accumulation of human capital.
Output in the natural resource sector depends on the stock of natural resources R, which is given and
constant.7Output is produced with a constant returns technology of the form
Y Rt = atR
l1  0 <  < 1 (5)
where at is the level of technology and l is unskilled labor. As in Bravo-Ortega and Gregorio (2005), R
represents a measure of the endowment of the natural resources and its impact on output. This sector
benets from an externality arising from the human capital accumulated by the skilled workers. In
particular, we assume that the externality depends on the average stock of human capital of the current
generation, at = maxfa; aH2tg, with a being positive constant and H2t is average stock of human capital.8
7This assumption is similar to those used by Bravo-Ortega and Gregorio (2005), Aldave Ruiz and García-Peñalosa (2009)
and Matsuyama (1992). Allowing for depletion of the natural resources would tend to imply decreasing R over time, hence,
output and the rents. We refrain from the normative analysis of the natural resource management of those Stiglitz (1974),
Solow (1974), Dasgupta and Heal (1974), Mitra (2002), dAlbis and Ambec (2010). Of course, natural resource management
is one of the most important aspects of resource economics, but here, we focus on rents appropriation.
8The assumption that production technology in the natural resource sector increases with average stock of human capital
is not crucial for our results, we need it to ensure that the natural resource sector (so the rents) is not disappeared in the
long run.
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In this way, although, the natural resources sector does not employ skilled labor but its production grows
with the human capital. Our formulation of at implies that when there is no human capital accumulation,
the productivity in the natural resource sector will be at its lower bound, at = a.
2.3 Rents and political behavior
Both sectors are competitive; in the manufacturing sector workers are paid their marginal product and
output is exhausted by the payments of wages. In the natural resources sector, labor is paid their marginal
product thus the wage bill is equal to (1  )Y Rt . Natural resources are state owned and the remaining
output Y Rt are the rents accrued to the government. The elite who have access to political technology
may become corrupt and may exploit their o¢ ces to divert these rents toward their pockets. Corruption
allows a member of the elite to divert a fraction dit of rents to his own pocket. Since all members of
the elite are identical, they divert dt share of rents. The remaining share (1   dt)Y Rt is held by the
government who then distributes it equally among all old agents.9 In this way every old agent whether
elite or worker receives a transfer (1 dt)Y
R
t
N from the government. The idea here is that members of the
elite get a higher share of rents from the natural resource sector when they are corrupt than when they
are not.
Corrupt agents exert two externalities on each other. First, there is a positive externality; a higher
number of corrupt agents make it easier to divert rents from the natural resource sector. In particular,
we assume that the fraction of rents diverted is a function of the proportion of the corrupt elite, that is
dt (pt) = pt. With this functional form, the diverted share is an increasing function of the number of
corrupt individuals, with d(0) = 0 and d(1) = 1. This implies that in the absence of corruption, the elite
get no rents and if they are all corrupt they divert all rents and share among themselves. This functional
form ensures that if only one agent is corrupt, he can only divert a share equal to 1n of available rents.
There is also a negative externality arising from the way these rents are shared amongst corrupt
agents, as in Ehrilich and Lui (1999). What share an individual gets depends on the size of his political
capital relative to aggregate political capital. The idea is that ones ability to collect rents depends on
how large ones personal power is relative to that of the others. In this way the share that he gets not
only depends on his own political capital but also on the political capital of others. The share of rents
9Transfers are introduced in the second period to have symmetry between corruption and non-corrupt equilibria. Since,
agents extract rents (a share dt) in the second period when they invest in political capital, thus, the remaining share (1 dt)
is transferred in the same period.
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that individual i gets, sit, is simply equal to his share in aggregate political capital, that is
sit =
Qit
nQt
=
Qit
Qit + (n  1)Q t
(6)
where Qit is individual is political capital, nQt is the aggregate political capital. We suppose that the
size of the elite, n is small such that every individual takes into account the fact that his investment in
political capital is going to increase aggregate stock of political capital. Thus, aggregate political capital
nQt can be decomposed into the political capital of individual i, Qit and the sum of political capital
of all others, (n   1)Q t . Since all elite are identical, in equilibrium they will have the same stock of
political capital, Qit = Qt, and each of them will obtain a fraction 1n of rents; however, each choosing
his investments takes Q t as given.
10 This type of rent sharing technology may not be suitable for the
cases where members of the elite collude to extract higher share of rents. Of course, there can be cases
where elite collude to extract higher share of rents. Introduction of collusive rent sharing would require
a di¤erent setting that allow for repeated interactions among the elite.
We further suppose that rent seeking is associated with some monetary cost. It can be the direct
monetary cost of participation in rent seeking (i.e. political participation) or the loss of revenues to
remain inconspicuous. It can also be viewed as the loss/ne incurred if the agent is caught being corrupt
and is punished. Given this, it is plausible to assume this monetary cost z to be proportional to their
second period income, where z 2 (0; 1). This implies that corrupt agents not only lose part of their illegal
income but they also lose part of their legal income (i.e. if there are nes). This cost can be linked to
the quality of institutions; with better quality institutions rent seeking will be more costly than with low
quality institutions.
Given this, we can then express the life time income of a corrupt individual as
Iict = (1  hit)Hi1t + (1  z)

(1  qit)Hi2t + Y R2t
1  dt
N
+ Y R2t dtsit

(7)
In the rst period the elite get only wage income. In the second period, the rst term is wage income,
the second term is transfers, and the third term is rents captured through corruption. The magnitude of
corruption depends on both dt i.e. the share of rents diverted and sit i.e. the share of individual out of it.
Since, what share an individual gets increases with his investment in political capital and decreases with
the investment of others, the last term in (7) will be larger with higher proportion of corrupt agents and
with higher agents investment in the political capital, and it will be smaller with more political capital
accumulated by others.
10Ehrilich and Lui (1999) use sit = 1 + log

Qit
Qt

, which has a disadvantage that if agents invest di¤erent amounts of
time then the share they receive does not add up to total rents available.
9
2.4 Consumption
Agents consume all their income at the end of every period.11 The lifetime consumption of unskilled
workers depends on their labor income and the transfers they receive when old. The consumption of
the elite on the other hand depends on their investment in human capital, corruption and cost of being
corrupt, and their share of political capital relative to the rest of the agents. The elite are homogeneous
and we consider only the symmetric equilibria, thus, in equilibrium either all will be corrupt or all will
stay honest, this implies that either d = 0 or d = 1. For d = 0, there is no rents appropriation by the elite
(no corruption), thus their income will be their wages plus the transfers that they receive when old. On
the contrary, d = 1 implies that all members of the elite are corrupt and they are appropriating all rents
accrued from the natural resources sector. In this case, apart from their labor income, the elite get their
share from rents according to their relative political capital, and since the elite divert all rents, there are
no transfers.
Given this, total consumption of the elite when there is no corruption is cnint = (1   hi1t)Hi1t+
Hi2t +
Y R2t
N , where the subscript in indicates that agent i is not corrupt and the superscript n indicates
that all other members of the elite are not corrupt. When all members of the elite are corrupt, they
divert all rents from the natural resource sector. Each of them consumes ccict = (1   hit)Hi1t + (1  
z)

Hi2t(1  qit) + Y R2t Qi2tnQ2t

, which in equilibrium is ccict = (1 hit)Hi1t+(1 z)

Hi2t(1  qit) + Y
R
2t
n

,
where the subscript ic indicates that agent i is corrupt and the superscript c indicates that all other
members of the elite are corrupt. There are three main di¤erences when we compare consumption in the
case where there is corruption to the case where there is no corruption. First, with corruption the elite
get political rents coming from the natural resource sector. Second, they get lower wage income in the
second period as they invest part of their time qt in accumulating political capital. Third, since there is
a monetary cost of being corrupt, a fraction z from their second period income is now eroded.
3 The elite decision problem
The elites decision making involves two dimensions: rst, whether to invest in political capital or not;
and second, the time allocation between accumulating capitals (human and political) and working. First,
the agent decides whether to invest in political capital or not which depends on the available rents, the
share of rents that he gets and the monetary cost. By investing in political capital, he can divert the rents
but doing this is associated with a loss of fraction z of his second period income that is dissipated. Then
11Although, agents consume their income at the end of every period, the two-period model is useful for our problem as
it augment the trade-o¤ between the investment in human and political capitals.
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he chooses his optimal time investments in both human and political capitals. If he chooses not to invest
in political capital, he will decide time allocation between accumulating human capital and working in the
rst period, while in the second period he devotes his entire time to working. If he chooses to be corrupt,
in the rst period, he will decide the optimal time allocation between human capital accumulation and
working, and in the second period between political capital accumulation and working.
We proceed to solve the system backwards. In the rst step, we obtain the optimal time allocation
in both situations, with and without corruption. We start with high-growth (no-corruption) equilibrium.
We nd the optimal investment in human capital accumulation ht when the economy is in high-growth
equilibrium (i.e. when there is no investment in political capital). Next, we obtain the optimal time
allocation in human capital ht and in political capital qt in the presence of corruption. Then, in the second
step, we compare the level of utility in each of these equilibria and dene the existence of equilibrium
under parametric ranges. While doing so, we allow individuals to invest di¤erently than each other.
3.1 The high-growth (no corruption) equilibrium
We start with a decision to invest in human capital in the high growth equilibrium which is dened as
an equilibrium in which qt = 0. The maximization problem faced by the agent is
max
c;h
U = c1t + c2t
s.t. Hi2t = AhitHi1t
c1t = (1  hit)Hi1t
c2t = Hi2t +
Y R2t
N
together with the constraint 0  ht  1. The individual takes output in the natural resource sector Y R2t
as given. The rst order conditions yield the high-growth time devoted to human capital investment
hh = (A)
1
1  (8-a)
While deciding his investment in human capital, the agent faces a trade-o¤ where more time devoted to
schooling implies less earnings when young but more earnings when old.
From (2), in high-growth equilibrium, human capital and output grow at
1 + gh = A (A)

1  (8-b)
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In the high-growth equilibrium, the growth rate will be faster the more patient individuals are, the more
productive the human capital technology is, and the higher the returns to human capital accumulation
are.
3.2 Equilibria with corruption
Consider now the maximization problem faced by a member of the elite who chooses to be corrupt when
others are corrupt (qt > 0; Q
 
t > 0). The maximization problem is
max
c;h
U = c1t + c2t
s.t. Hi2t = AhitHi1t
Qi2t = Bq

itQi1t
c1t = (1  hit)Hi1t
c2t = (1  z)

Hi2t(1  qit) + Y R2t
Qi2t
nQ2t

together with the constraints 0  ht  1 and 0  qt  1. The individual takes the output in the natural
resource sector Y R2t and the political capital Q
 
2t of others as given, so that we can express utility as
U = (1  hit)Hi1t + (1  z)

AhitHi1t(1  qit) +
atR
BqitQi1t
BqitQi1t + (n  1)Q 2t

where  = l1 . The rst order conditions for ht and qt yield
hit = [A(1  z) (1  qit)]
1
1  (9-a)
qit  R Bq

itQi1t(n  1)Q 2t
(Qi2t + (n  1)Q 2t)2
at
AhitHi1t
(9-b)
From equation (9   a), it is evident that there is a trade-o¤ between human and political capital accu-
mulations. A higher investment in political capital would imply spending less time working when old,
which in turn implies that the returns to his human capital in the second period would be lower. Thus
higher investment in political capital is associated with lower investment in human capital. Further, a
higher cost of political participation implies that a higher share of the second period income would be
lost which reduces the returns to human capital accumulation so the incentives to invest in it.
In equation (9 b), the individual chooses his investment in political capital while taking the investment
of others Q 2t as given. Since the share of rents that an individual gets depends on his investment in
political capital relative to the others, the more others invest in political capital, the smaller is the
share that the individual gets and thus lower he invests in political capital. Moreover, since agents
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are symmetric, all agents invest the same time in accumulating political and human capital, qit = qt ,
hit = h

t , and all have the same political and human capital, Qi2t = Q
 
2t = Q2t, Hi2t = H2t. Equation
(9  b) then becomes
qt  R

n  1
n2

at
H2t
(9-c)
From equation (9  c), it is evident that the higher the endowment of natural resources is, the higher will
be the investment in political capital. The size of the elite n has a negative impact on the investment
in political capital. A higher n implies that the rents will be shared amongst many thus the share that
individual i gets would be smaller. This condenses the utility of being corrupt, which in turn reduces
the incentives to invest in political capital. Thus, increasing equality in access to political participation
would reduce the investment in political capital.
Investment in political capital depends on the endowments of natural resources and (9   c) can be
written as
qt 

R
R

(9-d)
where R =

n2
a(n 1)
 1

. Since the time allocation is bounded, depending on the endowment of natural
resources R, from equation (9   d), we can have an interior solution (where 1 > qt > 0) or a corner
solution (where qt = 1). Thus there can be two equilibria, a poverty-trap equilibrium (corner solution)
when the endowment of natural resources is greater or equal to R, and a low-growth equilibrium (interior
solution) when the endowment of natural resources is less than R.
3.2.1 The poverty-trap equilibrium
The poverty-trap equilibrium arises when the level of natural resources is so high (i.e. R  R) that in the
second period agents allocate their entire time in accumulating political capital. For high endowment of
natural resources, accruing rents are too high that the incentives to accumulate political capital eliminate
incentives to invest in human capital and to work in the manufacturing sector. In this way, investment
in political capital completely crowds out investment in human capital. The solution to individual
maximization in (9  d) implies that for any R  R
qp = 1 (10-a)
hp = 0 (10-b)
When the investment in human capital is zero, in equation (9   c), at = a. In the rst period, the elite
devote no time to human capital accumulation thus they spend their entire time working. In the second
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period, they devote their entire time for political capital accumulation and do not work at all. As no one
invests in human capital, there is no growth, gp = 0.
3.2.2 The low-growth equilibrium
The economy is in low-growth equilibrium when natural resource endowments are not too high to compel
agents to invest their entire second period time in accumulating political capital. From (9   d), qt < 1
for any R < R. Given this, the low-growth investments in human and political capital are
ql =
aR(n  1)
n2
(11-a)
hl =

A(1  z)

1  aR
(n  1)
n2
 1
1 
(11-b)
The rate of growth of human capital and output is given by
1 + gl = A

A(1  z)

1  aR
(n  1)
n2
 
1 
(11-c)
The optimal investment in political capital increases with the endowment of natural resources and
decreases with the number of the elite n. A higher resource endowment implies higher rents thus higher
incentives to invest in political capital whereas a higher n implies a lower share of rents that every one
gets thus lower incentives to invest in political capital. Moreover, since investment in human capital
decreases with investment in political capital, a higher endowment of natural resources would imply a
lower investment in human capital and a higher n would imply a higher investment in human capital.
Thus, in the low-growth equilibrium, a higher endowment of natural resources increases the investment
in political capital and reduces the investment in human capital which in turn reduces the rate of growth.
Whereas a lower inequality reduces the investment in political capital and increases the investment in
human capital which in turn increases the rate of growth. Furthermore, the rate of growth decreases
with cost of political participation and returns to political capital, and increases with returns to human
capital.
3.3 The decision to accumulate political capital
In the previous section, we presented individual optimization problem and obtained optimal time alloca-
tions in both human and political capitals, and the corresponding equilibria. In this section, we look at
the existence of those equilibria where an individual decides to invest in political capital while comparing
his utility in various scenarios and by taking into account the investments of the others. The individual
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chooses to invest in political capital if it generates higher welfare than by not investing. Given the di¤er-
ent equilibria in previous section, there are three possible scenarios depending on whether others invest
an amount qt = 0, qt = 1 or qt = ql in political capital. Since, returns to political capital depend on
the rents from natural resource sector, the crucial element for the existence of di¤erent equilibria would
be the endowment of natural resources. Before going into the details of utility comparisons, we suppose
 = 12 . Although, the existence of equilibria can be shown for any value of , xing  =
1
2 helps us to
dene di¤erent thresholds of resource endowment that demarcate di¤erent equilibria.
3.3.1 When all others invest qt = 0
Consider rst the case when all others n 1 are honest, i.e. they do not invest in political capital, qt = 0.
Individual i takes the behavior of all others as given and compares the utility when he also does not
invest in political capital with that of when he invests. If he does not invest in political capital then there
is no rent appropriation and all old agents get equal transfers from the government. If this is the case,
the time invested in accumulating human capital is hh, and the utility of being honest is
Unint = (1  hh)Hi1t + 

AhhHi1t +
ant R

N

where ant = aH2t = aAh

hH1t which requires H1t >
an
aAhh
implying that even when one agent invests
in human capital (given the positive inherited human capital), the production technology in the natural
resource sector would be at = aH2t.
Consider now a situation where the individual chooses to be corrupt when every one else is honest. If
the agent opts to invest in political capital, since he is the only one to invest, our rent diverting technology
implies that he can divert a fraction 1n of rents while the remaining fraction
n 1
n is distributed among old
population. Moreover, since other agents have no political capital, the optimal investment is an innitely
small amount q = ", where " ! 0. While deciding about his investment in human capital, individual
takes into account that there is a monetary cost associated with being corrupt, thus the returns that he
will get from his investment in human capital would be lower. Given this, the individual maximization
problem when he is the only one to invest in political capital is
max
c;h
U = c1t + c2t
s.t. Hi2t = AhitHi1t
c1t = (1  hit)Hi1t
c2t = (1  z)

Hi2t + Y
R
2t

1
N
(
n  1
n
) +
1
n

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The rst order conditions yield bh = [(1  z)A] 11  (12)
Since part of second period income is now eroded, the optimal investment in human capital is lower than
the case of a high-growth equilibrium.
Given the optimal investment in human capital accumulation and taking into account the rents and
transfers, the utility of being corrupt when others are honest is
Unict = (1  bh)Hi1t +  (1  z)AbhHi1t(1  ") + actR 1N (1  1n ) + 1n

where act = aH2t = a
AbhHi1t+(n 1)AhhH1t
n .
Proposition 1 8R  R, there exists a high-growth equilibrium such that no one invests in political
capital.
Proof. See Appendix 1.
For the endowment of natural resources less than are equal to R, returns to political capital are so low
that no one has incentive to invest in political capital. Thus for R  R, the economy is in high-growth
equilibrium with no corruption and higher human capital, where
R 
 
Nn2
 
1  (1  z)2
2a [(1  z) (N + n  1)(n  z)  n2]
! 1

(13)
Whereas, for the endowment of natural resources greater than R, the individual invests in political capital
even though all others do not, implying that a high-growth is not an equilibrium for any R > R. The
threshold R depends on the cost of political participation z, and the number of the elite n. It increases
with z; the higher the cost of political participation is, the higher will be R, thus, the higher will be
the range of R where a high-growth equilibrium exists. If there is zero cost of political participation,
z = 0, then R = 0 and the high-growth equilibrium does not exist. This implies that with zero cost, for
any endowment of natural resources it will always be protable to invest in political capital. Whereas, a
non-zero cost of political participation implies that the individual loses a part of his legal income as well;
thus, when there is low endowment of natural resources, the rents are too small to cover the expected
losses caused by z and the individual has no incentive to invest in political capital. The threshold R
also increases with the number of the elite n.12 The lower inequality in access to education and political
process is (a higher n), the higher will be the range of natural resource endowments for which there is
a high-growth equilibrium. Thus, reducing inequality in access to education and political process would
increase the range of R for which a high-growth equilibrium exists.
12This is always true for any n  3 and N  n+ 1.
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3.3.2 When all others invest qt = 1
When all others are corrupt and they invest qt = 1 time in political capital accumulation, if agent i
also invests in political capital, in equilibrium qt = 1 and ht = 0. In the rst period, they invest their
entire time working in the manufacturing sector and in the second period, they invest their entire time
accumulating political capital and there will be no production in the manufacturing sector.13 Since all
agents are corrupt, they divert all rents and in equilibrium every one gets 1n share of it. Given this the
utility of being corrupt when every one else is corrupt is
U cict = Hi1t +
(1  z)aR
n
If the individual chooses not to be corrupt when all other agents are corrupt, he solves his maximization
problem by taking into account the fact that all others are corrupt. He invests ht = hh in human capital
accumulation. Since all n 1 agents are corrupt, they divert n 1n share of rents from the natural resource
sector and the remaining 1n share of rents is distributed among all old agents. Given, this the utility of
being honest when all others are corrupt is
U cint = (1  hh)Hi1t + 

AhhHi1t +
ant R

N

n  1
n

where ant = aH2t. Since, other n  1 do not invest in human capital, the average stock of human capital
will be, H2t =
AhhHi1t
n .
Proposition 2 8R  bR, there exists a poverty-trap equilibrium such that all members of the elite invest
qt = 1 in political capital.
Proof. See Appendix 2.
The endowments of natural resources are so high that all members of the elite devote their entire
second period time to accumulating political capital and there is no production in the manufacturing
sector. Thus for any R  bR, there exists a poverty-trap equilibrium, where
bR   A2H1tNn2
2 [2Nna(1  z)  A2H1ta(n  1)]
 1

(14)
13Since, output in the manufacturing sector depends on the stock of human capital, the output of the manufacturing sector
will be di¤erent for the rst generation (as agents inherit a positive stock of human capital) than the subsequent generations
(there is no human capital). The inherited human capital of the individual of rst generation is H2t 1 = Hi11 > 0, and
since agents invest their entire time in working when young (no human capital accumulation), the wage that the elite
will get is Hi11. Given the wage in the rst period, the utility of being corrupt will be Ucic1 = Hi11 + (1   z)al
1 R
n
.
Whereas, in the subsequent periods, since there is no human capital accumulation ( Hi21 = 0), there is no production in the
manufacturing sector, thus no wage. And since there is no wage income, the only income of the elite will be the rents that
they appropriate from the natural resource sector. The utility of being corrupt in this case will be Ucic2 = (1 z)al
1 R
n
.
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Whereas, for the endowment of natural resources is lower than bR, the agent do not invest in political
capital even when every one else is investing.
From the individual maximization in the previous section, we have that the poverty-trap equilibrium
exists (i.e. it is optimal to invest qt = 1) for any endowment of natural resources greater or equal to R. In
this way, for the existence of poverty-trap equilibrium, we have two conditions, i.e. from the optimization
problem, we have R  R and from the above incentive constraint, we have R  bR. By comparing these
two thresholds of R, we nd that R is greater than bR for any cost of political participation less than z,
where
z  1  aA
2H1t(n  1)(N + 2)
4Nna
For the rest of the paper, we assume that the cost of political participation is not too large to erode the
incentives to be corrupt, i.e. R  bR.
Assumption A1: z  z.
Assumption A1 implies that when it is optimal to invest qt = 1 time in political capital accumula-
tion, the poverty-trap equilibrium always exists. Note that for any z > z, there will be a poverty-trap
equilibrium for any R  bR.
3.3.3 When all others invest qt = ql
When all others are corrupt and they invest qt = ql in political capital, if the agent i also invests in
political capital, in equilibrium qt = ql and ht = hl. Since all agents are corrupt, they divert all rents
and in equilibrium every one gets 1n share of it. Given this the utility of being corrupt when every one
else is corrupt is
U cict = (1  hl)Hi1t + (1  z)

AhlHi1t(1  ql) + actR

1
n

where act = maxfa; aH2tg. We have H2t = AhlH1t, and aH2t is greater than a for hl > h 

a
aAH1t
 1

.
By comparing hl with h, we have hl  h for all R  eR   n2a(n 1) 1  11 z  hhh1 
1

, which
implies that act = aAh

lH1t for all R  eR and act = a for all R > eR. U cict is piecewise concave function
with respect to R in the range R 2 (0; R) with a possible kink at R = eR .14
14The detailed derivations of the function Ucict are given in Appendix 3.
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If the individual chooses not to be corrupt when all others are corrupt, he solves his maximization
problem by taking into account the fact that all others are corrupt. Since all n 1 agents are corrupt, they
divert n 1n share of rents from natural resource sector and the remaining
1
n share of rents is distributed
among all old agents. Given this, the utility if being honest when all others are corrupt is
U cint = (1  hh)Hi1t + 

AhhHi1t +
ant R

N

n  1
n

where ant = aH2t = a

AhhHi1t+(n 1)AhlH1t
n

and U cint is a concave function with respect to R in the
range R 2 (0; R).15
By comparing the both utilities, there exists N  0 such that U cict = U cint at R = R and for any
R > R, U cict > U
c
int. In the remaining of the paper, we consider N > N , where
N 
(1  z   x) (n  1)

x
 
1  + n  1

n(1  z)

(n  1)(1  )

x  x  1 

+ (1  z   x)

where x =

h
hh
1 
. Graphically,
Figure 1
Combining this with our results from the individual optimization problem which implies that the
low-growth equilibrium exists for R < R, we have our results in Proposition 3.
15The detailed derivations of the function Ucint are given in Appendix 3.
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Proposition 3 8N > N , there exists a unique R such that a low-growth equilibrium exists for R > R 
R where all members of the elite invest qt = ql in political capital.
Proof. See Appendix 3.
The low-growth equilibrium exists for the intermediate range of the natural resource endowments. It
does not exist for a lower endowment of natural resources as lower endowment would imply low rents, thus,
no investment in political capital, and it does not exist for a higher endowment of natural resources as
higher endowment would imply high rents, thus, investing entire second period time in political capital.16
4 Natural resource thresholds and equilibria
4.1 Equilibrium congurations
In this section we use our results from the previous section to compare di¤erent thresholds of natural
resource endowments that characterize the three possible equilibria. Our results imply that
 the high-growth equilibrium exists for all R  R.
 the low-growth equilibrium exists for all R  R < R.
 the poverty-trap exists for all R  R.
From the Assumption A1, we know that R is always greater than bR. By comparing R with R, we
nd that R > R for all z greater than bz, where
bz  1   (n  1)(N + n  1) +p(n  1)2(N + n  1)2 + [2N + (n  1)(2 +N)] (N(n  1) + 2n2)
2N + (n  1)(2 +N)
By comparing R with R, we know from Proposition 3 that R > R. Thus, for z > bz we know that R is
greater than R and since R is always greater than R, we have R > R. Whereas, for cost of political
participation less than bz, R > R and also R > R, since, we do not have expression for R, we do not
know whether R is greater than or less than R.
Proposition 4 8z > bz; there is a unique poverty-trap equilibrium 8R > R, there is a unique high-growth
equilibrium 8R < R, whereas for R  R  R, there are multiple equilibria, where for R > R  R, high-
growth and low-growth equilibria coexist and for R  R  R, high-growth and poverty-trap equilibria
coexist.
16We are unable to nd an expression for R, thus, we can not make comparative statics of R with respect to cost of
political participation z or inequality in access to education and political process n.
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Proposition 4 depicts the case of quality institutions where costs of political participation are higher.
For low and high endowments of natural resources, there is a unique high-growth and a poverty-trap
equilibrium, respectively. In Figure 2, we depict our results of better quality institutions from Proposition
4
Figure 2
Existence of multiple equilibria for the intermediate levels of natural resource endowments imply that
the relationship between natural resources and resource-curse is non-monotonic. High-growth equilibrium
coexist with both low-growth and poverty-trap equilibria. Thus, we can have countries with identical
endowments of natural resources experiencing two di¤erent growth regimes; a high-growth regime with
no corruption and high investment in human capital, or a poverty-trap with no growth, no investment in
education and high corruption.
Proposition 5 8z < bz and R > R, there is a unique poverty-trap equilibrium 8R > R, there is a unique
high-growth equilibrium 8R < R, there is a unique low-growth equilibrium for R > R  R, whereas for
R > R  R, there are multiple equilibria, where high-growth and low-growth equilibria coexist.
Proposition 5 depicts the case of bad institutions where cost of political participation is low. There
are three main di¤erences from the case with better quality institutions; rst, with low cost of political
participation, high-growth and poverty-trap equilibria do not coexist. Second, the range of natural
resource endowments where there is a unique poverty-trap equilibrium is higher i.e. it exists for any
R > R which is smaller than R in Figure 2. Third, with low quality institutions for certain levels
of R, there is a unique low-growth equilibrium while with quality institution it always coexisted with
a high-growth equilibrium. In Figure 3, we depict our results of low quality institutions presented in
Proposition 5
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Figure 3
Figure 3 depicts the case of low quality institutions. For low endowment of natural resources, there
is a unique high-growth equilibrium and for high endowments of natural resources, there is a unique
poverty-trap equilibrium. For the intermediate levels, the high-growth and the low-growth equilibria
coexist for R 2 (R;R), and for any R > R > R, there is a unique low-growth equilibrium.
With z < bz, there can be a possibility where R is lower than R. In Figure 4, we put our results of
Proposition 5 with R < R. For low endowment of natural resources only the high-growth equilibrium
exists while for high endowment of natural resources only the poverty-trap equilibrium exists. For the
intermediate ranges, the low-growth equilibrium exists for R 2 (R;R). In the range of endowments
R 2 (R;R), there is a possibility of no symmetric equilibrium.
Figure 4
The no-equilibrium scenario can be attributed to the fact that we are looking at only the symmetric
equilibrium, i.e. either all members of the elite invest in political capital or no one invests. Note that for
the stock of natural resources less or equal to R, the proportion of the elite investing in political capital
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is zero, pt = 0 and for any stock of natural resources greater or equal to R, pt = 1. Thus, moving from R
to R, the proportion of the elite investing in political capital jumps from zero to one. Although, we are
unable to show it analytically, our intuition is that by allowing for an asymmetric equilibrium, there can
be an equilibrium where a proportion of the elite would be investing in political capital.
In the above equilibrium congurations, the thresholds of natural resource endowments that demarcate
di¤erent equilibria are endogenous and depend on model parameters. The policies that a¤ect these
parameters can then shift the economy to a di¤erent equilibrium. The region where the high-growth
equilibrium exists depends on inequality in access to education and political participation, n and the
quality of institutions, z. Since R depends on the cost of political participation and the number of elite,
the multiple equilibria are determined by both z and n. Threshold R increases with n, which is to say
that increasing access to education and political participation would increase the region where the high-
growth is equilibrium. Whereas, the threshold R decreases with n implying that increasing access to
education and political participation would reduce the region of natural resource endowments where the
poverty-trap is equilibrium.
Another crucial element in the determination of multiple equilibria is the cost of political participation.
When there is no cost involved in rent seeking i.e. z = 0, then R = 0, and the high-growth equilibrium
does not exist. The intuition behind this is very straight-forward, natural resources create rents and if
there is no cost involved in directing these rents to ones own pockets, even an innitely small amount of
investment in political capital would be su¢ cient to extract all rents. When there is no cost of political
participation, the utility of being corrupt will always be higher than the utility of being honest even if
all other agents were honest. This is analogous to say that in the absence of quality institutions, natural
resources can only be curse but if the institutions are better (i.e. z is high), it is possible to enjoy a
high-growth with high endowments of natural resources.
4.2 Comparative statics
In this section, we summarize our results and look at the features of di¤erent equilibria. Table 1 summa-
rizes our results for investments in both human and political capitals, the growth rate and the aggregate
output. Natural resource endowments demarcate regions where each of the three equilibria exists. It is
evident from the third row of the Table 1 that resource abundance increases the incentives to invest in
political capital, and since high investment in political capital crowds out investment in human capital, a
higher endowment of natural resources reduces investments in human capital (in second row). Moreover,
since human capital is the only productive capital, reducing investment in it would reduce the rate of
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growth. When endowments are su¢ ciently high, the elite when young do not invest in schooling, and
when old, they invest their entire time in accumulating political capital. Consequently, there is no human
capital and no production in the manufacturing sector.
Table 1: Characterization of equilibria
High-growth Low-growth Poverty-trap
Natural R  R R  R < R R  R
resources
Human hh = (A)
1
1  hl =

A(1  z)  1    R
R
 11  hp = 0
capital ht
Political qh = 0 ql =
 
R
R

qp = 1
capital qt
Growth gh = A (A)

1  gl = A

A(1  z)  1    R
R
 1  gp = 0
of H
Aggregate Yht = nH1t[1 + (1 + gh)(1   Ylt = nH1t[1 + (1 + gl)((1  (1  z) Yp1 = nH11 + al1 R
output +al
1 
R
n2
] (1    R
R

) + al
1 
R
n2
)] Yp2 = al
1 
R
Apart from a¤ecting the existence of di¤erent equilibria, natural resources have an impact on aggregate
output as well. It a¤ects aggregate output through three channels. First, there is a direct positive
impact as high endowment of natural resources implies higher production in the natural resources sector
implying higher aggregate output. Second, there is an indirect negative e¤ect arising from the investment
in political capital. Higher endowment of natural resources increases the investment in political capital
that reduces time invested in human capital as well as time spent working. Thus, with higher endowment
of natural resources, output in the manufacturing sector and aggregate output would decline. Third, an
indirect negative e¤ect arises through the rate of growth. Higher endowment of natural resources reduces
the rate of growth which results in lower output in both manufacturing and natural resources sectors.
The overall impact of natural resource abundance on aggregate output is ambiguous and depends on the
type of equilibrium. In the high-growth equilibrium, column one of the fth row, the aggregate output
increases with R, hence resources are blessings. In the high-growth equilibrium the investment in human
capital and thus the rate of growth would increase with R. Furthermore, a higher R implies a higher
production in the natural resource sector and aggregate output. In the case of a low-growth equilibrium,
the e¤ect of R is ambiguous. A higher R increases output in the natural resource sector, but reduces
the time spent working in the manufacturing sector and investment in human capital, thus the rate of
growth.
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5 Conclusion
Recent empirical evidence suggests that relatively resource rich countries tend to have lower economic
growth, higher corruption and lower level of education. In this paper, we provide a theory behind this
evidence where abundance of natural resources a¤ects both corruption and education, which in turn
determines the rate of growth. We have developed an endogenous growth model for an economy divided
in two classes; the elite and workers. The former is a privileged class who has access to both education
and the political process. Apart from the industrial sector, there is a natural resource sector that creates
rents. The rents from natural resource sector accrue to the government, which attracts rent seeking.
Protable rent seeking requires time investment in political capital accumulation, which crowds out time
invested in education.
Our predictions in this paper are in line with the empirical ndings that the natural resources curse
operates through the crowding out of productive capital and rent seeking. Furthermore, the relationship
between abundance of natural resource and the resource curse is non-monotonic. We nd that depending
on the natural resource endowments, there can be three di¤erent growth regimes. There are endogenous
thresholds of natural resource endowments that demarcate di¤erent equilibria. For low endowment of
natural resources, there is a unique high-growth equilibrium with faster growth, higher education attain-
ment, and no corruption, while for high endowment of natural resources, there is a unique poverty-trap
equilibrium with no growth, no education attainment and very high corruption. In the intermediate
ranges, there are multiple equilibria.
The thresholds are endogenous and crucially depend on inequality in access to human and political
capital accumulation and on the monetary cost associated with corruption. Increasing access to education
and political participation would increase the ranges of resource endowments where the high-growth
equilibrium exists. Institutions play pivotal role for the determination of di¤erent growth regimes. For
better quality institutions (i.e. higher cost of political participation), the range of natural resource
abundance where high-growth equilibrium exists would be higher. Thus, for higher cost of political
participation there are multiple equilibria, where for high abundance of natural resources, high-growth
and poverty-trap equilibria coexist, and for the intermediate ranges of natural resource abundance, high-
growth and low-growth equilibria coexist. Whereas, decrease in inequality in access to education and
political process increases the range of natural resources where the high-growth is in equilibrium and
decreases the rage of natural resources where the poverty-trap is an equilibrium.
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There is an important limitation in our model concerning the technology of natural resource sector.
The assumption that the natural resource sector employs only unskilled workers can be suitable for some
types of natural resources but may not be for the others. Second, this limits our analysis to see the
impact of natural resources on income inequality. Clearly, when the society is segmented in two classes,
abundance of natural resources may have redistributive implications as well. Allowing for more exible
settings may help to see the redistributive implications of natural resources.
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Appendix 1
In this Appendix, we prove the existence of a high-growth equilibrium. The high-growth equilibrium
exists if the utility of being honest is greater than the utility of being corrupt when every one else is
honest. The utility of being honest is
Unint = (1  hh)Hi1t + 

AhhHi1t +
atR

N

where at = aAhhH1t.
The utility of being corrupt is
Unict = (1  bh)Hi1t +  (1  z)AbhHi1t(1  ") + aH2tR 1N (1  1n ) + 1n

whereH2t =
H2it+(n 1)H 2t
n , since all others are honest, they invest hh time in human capital accumulation,
H 2t = Ah

hH1t, and H2t =
AbhHi1t+(n 1)AhhH1t
n . When "! 0, the utility of being corrupt when all others
are honest is
Unict = (1  bh)H1t +  (1  z)1 + AH1taR (N + n  1)Nn2 bh + (n  1)hh

Given both utilities, the existence of high-growth equilibrium requires
Unint(Hi1t; hh; a
n
t ; R)  Unict(Hi1t;bh; act ; R)
hh

1   + aR

N

 bh(1  z)1   + aR (N + n  1)
Nn2

+ hh(1  z)
aR (N + n  1) (n  1)
Nn2
hh

1   + aR

Nn2
 
n2   (1  z) (N + n  1) (n  1)  bh(1  z)1   + aR (N + n  1)
Nn2

Nn2(1 )+aR  n2   (1  z) (N + n  1) (n  1)   bh
hh
!
(1 z)  Nn2(1  ) + aR (N + n  1)
By substituting in for bh and hh, we get
Nn2(1  ) + aR  n2   (1  z) (N + n  1) (n  1)  (1  z) 11   Nn2(1  ) + aR (N + n  1)
Nn2(1  )(1  (1  z) 11  )  aR

(1  z) 11  (N + n  1) + (1  z) (N + n  1) (n  1)  n2

By setting  = 12 and solving for R, we get
R  R 

Nn2(1  (1  z)2)
2a [(1  z) (N + n  1) (n  z)  n2]
 1
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Appendix 2
In this Appendix, we prove the existence of a poverty-trap equilibrium. The poverty-trap equilibrium
exists if the utility of being corrupt is greater than the utility of being honest when every one else is
corrupt. This requires
U cict(Hi1t; a; R)  U cint(Hi1t; hh; ant ; R)
Hi1t +
(1  z)aR
n
 (1  hh)Hi1t + AhhHi1t

1 +
aR(n  1)
Nn2

(1  z)aR
n
 AhhHi1t

1   + aR
(n  1)
Nn2

By substituting in for hh
(1  z)aR
n
 AHi1t (A)

1 

1   + aR
(n  1)
Nn2

By setting  = 12 and since in symmetric case Hi1t = H1t, we have
R  bR   A2H1tNn2
2 [2Nna(1  z)  A2H1ta(n  1)]
 1
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Appendix 3
In this appendix, we prove the existence of a low-growth equilibrium. The low-growth equilibrium
exists if and only if the following incentive compatibility constraint is satised
U cict(Hi1t; hl; ql; a
c
t ; R)  U cint(Hi1t; hh; ant ; R)
U cict = Hi1t

1 + Ahl (1  z)(1  ql)(1  )

+
(1  z)actR
n
where act =
8<: aAhlH1t 8hl  ha 8hl < h
Note that hl  h for all R  eR   n2a(n 1) 1  11 z  hhh1 
1

, which implies that act =
aAhlH1t for all R  eR and act = a for all R > eR.
Furthermore, from the agents optimization problem, we know that the low-growth equilibrium exists
for any R < R. Also, we know that for any R  R, hl = 0. By comparing eR and R; since hl decreases
with R, and since at R = eR, hl = h > 0 and at R = R, hl = 0, we have R > eR. Thus the utility of
being corrupt is U cict(a
c
t = aAh

lH1t) for R < eR and U cict(act = a ) for eR < R < R.
U cict =
8>>><>>>:
Hi1t

1 + Ahl (1  z)(1  ql)(1  )

+
(1 z)aAhlH1tR
n 8R  eR
Hi1t

1 + Ahl (1  z)(1  ql)(1  )

+ (1 z)aR

n 8R > eR
U cict is piecewise concave with respect to R in the range R 2 (0; R). In the following graph, we plot
the utility of being corrupt, which is piecewise concave,
32
Consider rst for 8R  eR
U cict = Hi1t

1 + Ahl (1  z)(1  ql)(1  )

+
(1  z)aAhlH1tR
n
By substituting in for hl = [A(1  z)(1  ql)]

1 
U cict = Hi1t

1 + A(1  z) [A(1  z)(1  ql)]

1 

(1  )(1  ql) + R

n

By setting  = 12 ,
U cict = Hi1t
"
1 +
(A(1  z))2 (1  ql)
2

(1  ql)
2
+
R
n
#
By substituting in for ql =
aR(n 1)
n2
U cict = Hi1t
"
1 +

A(1  z)
2n2
2  
n2   aR(n  1)  n2 + aR(2n  (n  1))#
First and second order conditions imply that U cict is a concave function of R for R 2 (0; eR).
Consider now for 8R > eR,
U cict = Hi1t
"
1 +

A(1  z)
2n2
2  
n2   aR(n  1)2#+ (1  z)aR
n
The rst and second order conditions imply that U cict is concave function of R for R 2 ( eR;R). Thus
U cict is piecewise concave function of R for R 2 (0; R). Further note that since @h

l
@R < 0,
@Ucict(a
c
t=a)
@R >
@Ucict(a
c
t=aAh

lH1t)
@R for any R >
eR. In the following, we plot utility of being corrupt as a function of the
natural resource endowments.
Consider now the utility of being honest when all others are corrupt
U cint = Hi1t

1 + Ahh(1  )

+
ant R
(n  1)
Nn
where ant = aAH1t

hh+(n 1)hl
n

.
U cint = Hi1t

1 + Ahh(1  )

+
aAH1th

hR
(n  1)(1 + (n  1)(1  z)(1  ql))
Nn2
By substituting in for ql =
aR(n 1)
n2
U cint = Hi1t
241 + Ahh
0@(1  ) + aR(n  1)

1 + (n  1)(1  z)

1  aR(n 1)n2

Nn2
1A35
First and second order conditions imply that U cint is concave function of R for R 2 (0; R).
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Given the behavior of both U cict and U
c
int functions, we can now look at the existence of equilibrium.
Consider rst R = 0; at R = 0, the utility of being corrupt is U cict = Hi1t
h
1 + Abh(1  z)(1  )i
and the utility of being honest when every one else is corrupt is U cint = Hi1t

1 + Ahh(1  )

. So at
R = 0, by comparing both utilities, we have U cict < U
c
int. Consider now R = R
; we know that at
R = R, we have ql = 1, hl = 0, act = a and a
n
t = aAh

hH1t=n. Given this, the utility of being corrupt
will be U cict = Hi1t +
(1 z)aR
n and the utility of staying honest when all others are corrupt will be
U cint = (1   hh)Hi1t + AhhHi1t

1 + aR
(n 1)
Nn2

. Our assumption A1 implies that U cict (R = R
) >
U cint (R = R
).
Thus we have at R = 0, U cict < U
c
int and at R = R
, U cict > U
c
int. Given this, and since both functions
are concave, we can have two possibilities; either these functions have single crossing or they cross thrice
in the range R 2 (0; R). We claim that there is a single point R such that U cict = U cint. The su¢ cient
condition for a single R would be that at R = eR, U cict > U cint. Remember that @Ucict(R> eR)@R > @Ucict(R= eR)@R .
In the following we prove that for a size of population not very small, there is always a single crossing
between U cict and U
c
int. In other words at R = eR, U cict > U cint.
U cict(R = eR) > U cint(R = eR)
Hi1t

1 + Ahl (1  z)(1  ql)(1  )

+
(1  z)actR
n
> Hi1t

1 + Ahh(1  )

+
ant R
(n  1)
Nn
By substituting in for act = aAh

lH1t and a
n
t = aAH1t

hh+(n 1)hl
n

hl (1  )x+
hl (1  z)aR
n
> hh(1  ) +
hhaR
(n  1)
Nn2
+
hl aR
(n  1)2
Nn2
where x = (1  z)(1  ql). Note that hh = (A)
1
1  and hl = hhx
1
1  ,
hl (1  )

x  x  1 

> hl
aR
n
 
x
 
1  (n  1)
Nn2
+
(n  1)2
Nn2
  (1  z)
!
(1  )

x  x  1 

>
aR
n

n  1
Nn2

x
 
1  + n  1

  (1  z)

By setting R = eR   n2a(n 1) 1  11 z  hhh1 
1

;
(1  )

x  x  1 

>
n
(n  1)
 
1  1
1  z

h
hh
1 !
n  1
Nn2

x
 
1  + n  1

  (1  z)

Note that x = (1  z)(1  ql) and ql = aR
(n 1)
n2 , by substituting in for R =
eR and simplifying, we have
x =

h
hh
1 
. Given this, we have
(1  )

x  x  1 

>
n
(n  1)

1  x
1  z

n  1
Nn2

x
 
1  + n  1

  (1  z)

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(n  1)(1  z)(1  )

x  x  1 

>
(1  z   x)
Nn

(n  1)

x
 
1  + n  1

 Nn(1  z)

Nn(1  z)

(n  1)(1  )

x  x  1 

+ (1  z   x)

> (1  z   x) (n  1)

x
 
1  + n  1

N > N 
(1  z   x) (n  1)

x
 
1  + n  1

n(1  z)

(n  1)(1  )

x  x  1 

+ (1  z   x)

Thus,for any N > N , there exists a unique R such that U cict = U
c
int and the low-growth equilibrium
exists for any R  R. Graphically;
It is important to note that for N < N , there are two possibilities: rst, there can be a unique R > eR
where both curves intersect. It is similar as if N > N with the only di¤erence that R will be greater than
R > eR.
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Second, there can be three interaction points where U cict = U
c
int.
In order to avoid multiple interaction points, we assume N > N . Given our condition in the individual
maximization problem which implies that the low-growth equilibrium exists for all R < R, and combining
it with the above incentive constraint which implies that the low-growth equilibrium exists for all R  R,
the low-growth equilibrium exists R > R  R.
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